External Data Security¶

This document describes the security model for loading and saving external data files in ONNX models. It is intended for maintainers working on the external data code paths.

Threat Model¶

When an ONNX model references external data files via relative paths, an attacker who controls the model file can attempt:

Symlink traversal: A final-component symlink in the external data path pointing to a sensitive file (e.g., /etc/shadow), causing ONNX to read or overwrite arbitrary files.
Parent-directory symlink: A symlink in a parent directory component of the external data path, bypassing a check that only inspects the final component.
Hardlink attacks: A hardlink to a sensitive file appearing as a normal file, bypassing symlink-only checks while still exposing unintended data.
Path traversal: Using .. segments or absolute paths to escape the model directory.

Defense Layers¶

We use a 4-layer defense-in-depth approach. Each entry point applies the layers appropriate to its context (see the table below).

Layer 1: Canonical Path Containment¶

C++: std::filesystem::weakly_canonical() resolves the path, then verifies it starts with the canonical base directory.

This catches .. traversal and symlinks in any path component (not just the final one).

Layer 2: Symlink Detection¶

C++: std::filesystem::is_symlink(data_path) rejects the final-component symlink.

This is a belt-and-suspenders check alongside containment. It provides a clear, specific error message when the final path component is a symlink.

Layer 3: Secure File Open with Post-Open Verification¶

Three platform-specific strategies, in order of preference:

Linux 5.6+: openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH | RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS) — atomic kernel containment. No TOCTOU. Falls back on ENOSYS.
FreeBSD 13+ / macOS 15+: openat(O_RESOLVE_BENEATH | O_NOFOLLOW) — equivalent BSD-style containment.
POSIX fallback: open(O_NOFOLLOW) + post-open inode comparison (fstat fd vs stat canonical path).
Windows: CreateFileW(FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT) + reparse point attribute check + inode comparison. Converted to CRT fd via _open_osfhandle() before returning.

All POSIX fds are opened with O_CLOEXEC. All platforms return a CRT file descriptor.

Hardlinks are detected via fstat() link count (POSIX) or GetFileInformationByHandle() (Windows), always fail closed.

Layer 4: Pre-Open Hardlink Count Check¶

C++: std::filesystem::hard_link_count(data_path) > 1 rejects files with multiple hardlinks before opening.

This is defense-in-depth alongside Layer 3’s post-open hardlink check. It provides a clear error message at the path level before any file I/O occurs.

Protected Entry Points¶

All Python entry points use the C++ open_external_data() function. In read mode it applies all four layers (pre-open validation via resolve_external_data_location for Layers 1, 2, 4, then Layer 3 post-open). In write mode it applies Layers 1 and 3 only — Layers 2 and 4 are skipped because the file may not yet exist. The C++ checker calls resolve_external_data_location directly without opening files, so Layer 3 does not apply there.

Entry Point	File	Mode	Layers
`resolve_external_data_location`	`onnx/checker.cc`	read	1, 2, 4
`open_external_data`	`onnx/checker.cc`	read	1, 2, 3, 4
`open_external_data`	`onnx/checker.cc`	write	1, 3
`load_external_data_for_tensor`	`onnx/external_data_helper.py`	read	1, 2, 3, 4 (via `open_external_data`)
`save_external_data`	`onnx/external_data_helper.py`	write	1, 3 (via `open_external_data`)
`ModelContainer._load_large_initializers`	`onnx/model_container.py`	read	1, 2, 3, 4 (via `open_external_data`)

Known Limitations¶

Windows¶

Reparse points (symlinks, junctions) are rejected via FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT + attribute check.
Symlink and hardlink tests are skipped on Windows in the test suite.

Case-Insensitive Filesystems¶

The canonical path containment checks (Layers 1 and 3) use string comparison. On case-insensitive filesystems (Windows NTFS, macOS HFS+), paths with different casing may incorrectly fail containment. This fails closed (false rejection, not a bypass).

Testing¶

Test coverage is in:

C++: onnx/test/cpp/checker_test.cc — *SymLink* tests for symlink detection and containment, OpenExternalData* for secure open and verification.
Python: onnx/test/test_external_data.py:
- TestSaveExternalDataSymlinkProtection — save-side symlink rejection.
- TestLoadExternalDataSymlinkProtection — load-side symlink rejection, parent-directory symlink, load_external_data_for_model rejection.
- TestLoadExternalDataHardlinkProtection — load-side hardlink rejection.
- TestSaveExternalDataAbsolutePathValidation — absolute path rejection.

Symlink and hardlink tests are skipped on Windows (os.name == "nt").

External Data Attribute Validation¶

This section describes the security model for validating external data attributes in ExternalDataInfo. It covers defenses against attribute injection (CWE-915) and resource exhaustion (CWE-400) via crafted external_data entries in TensorProto.

Advisory: GHSA-538c-55jv-c5g9

Threat Model¶

An attacker provides a malicious ONNX model with crafted external_data entries in TensorProto. The external_data field is a repeated StringStringEntryProto — a key-value store that accepts arbitrary strings for both key and value.

The attack is triggered during onnx.load() with no explicit checker invocation required. ExternalDataInfo.__init__ processes these key-value pairs to populate object attributes.

Attack vectors:

Arbitrary attribute injection: Setting unknown keys (e.g. evil_attr) causes setattr() to create arbitrary attributes on the ExternalDataInfo object. While no current consumer iterates over attributes, injected attributes create latent risk for future code.
Dunder attribute injection: Setting keys like __class__ or __dict__ corrupts the Python object’s internal state, enabling type confusion attacks.
Negative offset/length: Negative values for offset cause file.seek() to raise OSError. Negative length causes file.read(-1) to read the entire file to EOF, bypassing intended size limits.
Resource exhaustion (DoS): Setting length to a multi-petabyte value causes unbounded memory allocation when reading external data, even if the actual data file is small.

Four Python consumers of ExternalDataInfo exist: load_external_data_for_tensor, set_external_data / write_external_data_tensors, ModelContainer._load_large_initializers, and ReferenceEvaluator (in onnx/reference/reference_evaluator.py). (The C++ checker validates paths but does not use the Python ExternalDataInfo class.)

Defense Layers¶

We use a 3-layer defense-in-depth approach. Each layer addresses a different class of attack and operates at a different point in the processing pipeline.

Layer 1: Attribute Whitelist (CWE-915 Mitigation)¶

ExternalDataInfo.__init__ only accepts keys in _ALLOWED_EXTERNAL_DATA_KEYS: location, offset, length, checksum, basepath. Unknown keys are warned via warnings.warn() and ignored — this prevents arbitrary attribute injection.

This also blocks dunder attribute injection (e.g. __class__, __dict__) that could cause object type confusion.

Rationale: While we cannot prevent someone from constructing malicious protobuf directly, rejecting unknown keys at the Python object level is defense-in-depth that limits the attack surface. The whitelist is a frozenset to prevent runtime mutation.

Layer 2: Bounds Validation at Parse Time (CWE-400 Mitigation)¶

offset and length must be non-negative integers. Non-numeric strings raise ValueError. This catches obviously invalid values early, before any file I/O occurs.

Rationale: Negative offset causes file.seek(-1) to raise OSError; negative length causes file.read(-1) to read the entire file, bypassing intended size limits. Validating at parse time provides a clear error message at the point closest to the malicious input.

Layer 3: File-Size Validation at Consumption Time (CWE-400 Mitigation, Defense-in-Depth)¶

In load_external_data_for_tensor() and ModelContainer._load_large_initializers, before reading: offset <= file_size and offset + length <= file_size are verified. A 1KB data file cannot cause a multi-petabyte memory allocation.

Rationale: This is the critical safety net. It prevents memory exhaustion regardless of how the model was constructed — even via direct protobuf APIs that bypass Python-level parsing entirely. Validation happens at the point of actual file I/O, the last opportunity before harm occurs.

Why Layered Defense¶

Layer 1 (whitelist) catches the broadest class of attacks at parse time. It blocks attribute injection, dunder corruption, and any future unknown-key attack vector.
Layer 2 (bounds validation) catches obviously invalid numeric values at parse time, providing clear error messages.
Layer 3 (file-size validation) is the critical safety net that prevents actual harm at the I/O boundary. This layer cannot be bypassed even if an attacker crafts a model using protobuf APIs directly, because validation happens at the point of actual file read.

Protected Entry Points¶

Entry Point	File	Layers
`ExternalDataInfo.__init__`	`onnx/external_data_helper.py`	1, 2
`load_external_data_for_tensor`	`onnx/external_data_helper.py`	1, 2, 3
`set_external_data`	`onnx/external_data_helper.py`	1 (whitelist by overwrite)
`ModelContainer._load_large_initializers`	`onnx/model_container.py`	1, 2, 3

Testing¶

Test coverage is in onnx/test/test_external_data.py:

TestExternalDataInfoSecurity:
- CWE-915 (attribute injection): test_unknown_key_rejected, test_dunder_key_rejected, test_multiple_unknown_keys_all_rejected, test_allowed_keys_constant_is_frozen
- CWE-400 (bounds/DoS): test_negative_offset_rejected, test_negative_length_rejected, test_non_numeric_offset_raises, test_non_numeric_length_raises
- Regression guards: test_valid_external_data_accepted, test_zero_offset_and_length_accepted
TestLoadExternalDataFileSizeValidation:
- File-size validation: test_offset_exceeds_file_size_raises, test_length_exceeds_available_data_raises, test_valid_offset_and_length_load_correctly